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Knowledge and Auctoritas in Coornhert’s Zedekunst 







In 1586, one of the most important works of the Dutch philosopher Dirck Coornhert, 
Zedekunst dat is wellevenskunste or The art of the virtuous life,
1
 was first published
2
. This 
work was the first systematized form of ethics ever to have been written in the Dutch 
language. Apart from that, the text also provides us with a full overview of the philosophical 
and moral program of its writer. This program, which earned Coornhert the title of « the 
sixteenth century champion of moral perfectionism »
3
, can be rendered by three important 
lines of thought that also make out the core of the rest of his impressive œuvre:4 moral 
perfectibility
5
, the search for Truth and moderation in all things “human”6.  
As I hope to show, the right sort of knowledge plays a central part in Coornhert’s perfectibilist 
project, and this mostly with regard to the good management of the human emotions or 
“hartstochten”, which necessarily underlies the virtuous life or “welleven”. Since this article 
                                                 
1
 HANS and SIMONE MOOIJ-VALK have translated it more literally by “Ethics or the Art of 
living well”, cf. “Coornhert on virtue and nobility”, in: Christian Humanism (ed. A. A. 
MacDonald e.a.), Leiden, Koninklijke Brill, 2009, 157.  
2
 More information can be found on the site of the Coornhert foundation: 
http://www.coornhertstichting.nl/Coornhert/. I have chosen to work with the 1586 edition 
princeps annotated by the Russian Coornhert specialist Bruno Becker.  
3
 The expression belongs to Bruno Becker. Cf. HENK BONGER (red.), Op zoek naar het 
hoogste goed, 133-159; which contains the reprint of Becker’s famous article ‘Coornhert, de 
zestiende-eeuwse apostel der volmaakbaarheid’, first published in: Nederlands archief voor 
Kerkgeschiedenis, 19, 1926, 59-84.  
4
 Coornhert’s philosophy shows great coherence, as appears from the comparison of the 
Zedekunst with his former shorter texts on virtue. Cf. RUBEN BUYS, Coornhert in het klein. 
Korte teksten over deugd, onwetendheid en volmaakbaarheid, Amsterdam, AUP, 2011.  
5
 As Coornhert literally states in the Zedekunst, he holds the actual realisation of the virtuous 
life impossible. See ZK IV, III. 12. Coornhert does want his readers to become god-like, to 
yet again become the imago Dei they were originally created to be before the Fall; but he 
refutes the possibility of achieving divine perfection. I therefore prefer the term 
« perfectibility » over that of « perfectionism », for it renders the prevalence of the idea of  
this (im)possibility better.  
6
 Love, for example, is beyond moderation because it connects us with the divine and makes 
us god-like, cf. ZK I, VII. 15. 
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aims to probe not only the importance, but also the specificity of the role that knowledge 
plays within the general framework of the Zedekunst, I consider it useful to start by examining 
which intellectual authorities Coornhert uses to construe and to defend his program of moral 
self- individuation, as well as how he himself legitimizes them. In order to do that, I will also 
refer to other texts written by Coornhert, such as the first part of the Synode over de 
gewetensvrijheid
7
 (1582) and the first part of his Proces van’t ketter-dooden8 (1590), in which 
he inserted some of his correspondence with Lipsius. The explicitly polemical outset of these 
texts encouraged Coornhert to express his opinion on the use of authorities in general, that is 
to say, authorities biblical, patristic and classical. This is in a very conspicuous way far less 
the case in the Zedekunst, for in spite of this ethic’s occasionally controversial character, 
Coornhert wrote to put a hold on rather than to start a dispute of any kind. The second part of 
my contribution will further deepen the relation between Coornhert’s handling of auctoritas 
and the aim of his ethical project by examining his theory on knowledge as it appears from the 
Zedekunst’s fifth chapter of the second book, entitled « Vande kennisse ende wetenschap », as 
well as from the dedication or “Toe-eyghen brief” to this work. 
Before continuing, I want to make clear from the outset that the purpose of my contribution 
does not lie in locating each and every author Coornhert uses, whether implicitly or not. It 
would require a whole separate project to do so. Although we have at our disposal the 
dissertation by van der Meer on the classical elements in the Zedekunst,
 9
  a lot of gaps still 
need to be filled. For example, an overview study, including not only all the classical but also 
the medieval and contemporary sources for the Zedekunst, does not exist. Yet, given the 
specific text-strategies used by Coornhert, it seems to me that this task of filing his sources 







                                                 
7
 Its original title is Synodus. Van der conscientien vryheydt. 
8
 Both works are available in the digital library of the Coornhert foundation.  
9
 SUFFRIDUS VAN DER MEER, Bijdrage tot het onderzoek naar klassieke elementen in 
Coornhert’s Wellevenskunste, Amsterdam, gebr. Huisman en Hanenburg, 1934. 
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I. Coornhert and auctoritas. 
 
 
The pagan classics 
 
 
The first kind of knowledge Coornhert makes use of in the Zedekunst is provided by the 
pagan classical philosophers. The most important among them are, in chronological order: 
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca
10
. Throughout the entire Zedekunst, Coornhert makes use 
of the ideas and sayings of these thinkers from different philosophical backgrounds, thereto 
indistinctly adding the thoughts of  (early) Christian thinkers such as Boëthius and Thomas 
Aquinas, together with contemporary authors like Cornelius Valerius and Sebastianus Foxius 
Morzillus
11
. In this blending, Coornhert is no different from his colleagues: abundant 
intellectual borrowing was, in fact, customary among the humanists. It is far more significant 
that Coornhert rarely if ever mentions the name of these philosophers he draws upon: 
 
» Dat Coornhert slechts zelden een profaan wijsgeer met name noemt, zooals Zijderveld 
verder opmerkt, is juist: hij noemt alleen SENECA (IV.10.5). Doch zonder namen te noemen 
verwijst hij op verscheidene plaatsen naar oude wijsgeeren, bv.: een wys mensche (I.12.9), de 
verstandighste vande Ouden (III. 1.10), eenige vande gheleerdste OUden (V.7.12), de wyze 




Coornhert mostly quotes in a separate paragraph the texts of the more “literary” authors such 
as Ovid and Horace – without mentioning their names, however. Quoting Ovid, Coornhert 
only says that he is translating an “ouden” (i.e. an ancient thinker), and he only once mentions 
by name the “Poëet bij uitstek” Horace. Coornhert only refers to the names of important 
historical figures such as the ancient kings Agesilaüs, Philip II of Macedon, Alexander the 
Great and Darius – the latter mainly in his chapter on friendship. Some philosopher’s sayings 
are also explicitly quoted – Socrates’ famous “all I know is that I know nothing” 13 and his 
self-defence against Melite, or the philosopher Xenocrates in defending his friend Plato 
against the tyrant Dionysius – but like the former, these examples always take the form of 
historical facts or legends, never of textual citations introduced by the thinker’s name.  
                                                 
10
 See VAN DER MEER (v. fn. 9).  
11
Cf. GERRIT KUIPER, Orbis artium en renaissance I. Cornelius Valerius en Sebastianus 
Foxius Morzillus als bronnen van Coornhert, Harderwijk, Flevo, 1941. 
12
 VAN DER MEER (v. fn. 9), 164-165. 
13
 ZK VI, IX. 11.  
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It is also worth noting that Coornhert uses the intellectual legacy of his predecessors on 
several levels: first, on a “textual” level, either literally translating or paraphrasing the author 
in question
14
. Secondly, on an “intratextual” level, in allowing these authors to provide the 
philosophical undercurrents of his philosophy. And thirdly, on an “supratextual” level, in re-
using the textual organisation of some works or parts of works he has read 
15
. Quite often also, 
one author is used on several levels at once.  
Obviously, Coornhert’s particular treatment of his intellectual sources – i.e. the anonymous 
patchwork he constructs on the basis of their writings - might put the modern reader with his 
distanced view on the history of philosophy under the impression that he is dealing with 
someone who can be qualified as an “eclectic thinker”16. However, as stated in The Reformed 
thought on freedom, this would be a fairly unhistorical way of thinking which mixes up our 
own modern reading and writing practices with those of the early-modern author
17
. 
Coornhert’s particular way of using his sources pertains to the three compatible causes 
explained below.  
To assume that Coornhert only unconsciously re-used in the Zedekunst several thoughts and 
expressions he had encountered throughout his personal readings would oversimplify matters. 
Firstly, mentioning the name of his auctoritates would contradict the very essence of the 
ethical ideal he wants to propagate. Of course, Coornhert does essentially write for a not 
classically educated public he can’t risk to frighten off with name-juggling of any sort (cf. 
infra). He knows that his message of moral conversion will pass far more easily if he doesn’t 
try to dazzle his readers with names of authors and notes on philosophical schools they 
scarcely heard of. But far more importantly, we need to understand that the very foundation of 
Coornhert’s ideal of the virtuous life lies in the reader’s ability to internalize the ethical norms 
the Zedekunst sets out. Since the purpose of Coornhert’s ethic is to form self-regulating 
individuals, emphasizing the fact that the moral standards are mainly drawn from outside 
                                                 
14
 See also VAN DER MEER (v. fn. 9). 
15
 Van der Meer claims that Coornhert used the first book of the Ciceronian Offices for the 
general structure of the Zedekunst. Kuiper qualifies this statement in noting that the works of 
Valerius and Foxius also helped structure the Zedekunst. 
16
 See for example RUBEN BUYS, De kunst van het weldenken. Lekenfilosofie en volkstalig 
rationalisme in de Nederlanden (1550-1600), Amsterdam, AUP, 2009, S. 203: “Zo bladeren 
de weldenkers eclectisch door het antieke verleden op zoek naar beelden, argumenten en 
ideeën die hun geloof in de menselijke waardigheid en de mogelijkheid van morele 
verbetering kunnen ondersteunen”.  
17
 The Reformed thought on freedom. The Concept of free choice in early modern reformed 
theology (ed. WILLEM J. VAN ASSELT e.a.), Michigan, Baker Academic (coll. Texts & studies 
in Reformation & Post-Reformation thought), 2010, 25-26.  
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Coornhert’s personal experience would thwart his whole project. As will be shown, Coornhert 
considers moral theory to be useless, even “dead” knowledge if it is not put into practice. At 
the same time, however, Coornhert needs to avoid the personal anecdote: the moral 
knowledge he provides need always be of a general character, so that it reflects his idea of a 
natural law functioning as the kernel for the virtuous life (cf. infra), a law which makes it 
possible for everyone to become virtuous. 
What is important to Coornhert, as it should be to his readers, is the message in itself, not the 
messenger. The idea recalls an important passage of the first book of Boethius’ Consolation of 
Philosophy, of which Coornhert made two translations, one in 1557
18
 and one in 1585, one 
year before publishing the Zedekunst. In this passage, Boethius complains to Lady Philosophy 
about the loss of all his goods, including his beautiful library. The reply of Lady Philosophy 
shows the importance of the message as it stands in itself: 
 
» What most moves me, then, is not the look of this place but your own sorry appearance. I 
don’t need a library with comfortable chairs, ivory gewgaws, and big glass windows, but 
rather the workroom of your mind, for it isn’t the books that are important but the ideas in 





Secondly, the impression that Coornhert has randomly sewn together these quotations into a 
kind of philosophical patchwork must be nuanced on grounds of the combination of text 
practices specific to humanist thinkers with those particular to scholastic thinkers. As 
mentioned earlier, it is an established fact in Renaissance studies that humanists freely 
borrowed from others authors, especially the classics. In this prospect, Coornhert’s Zedekunst 
seems to be of no exception. Furthermore, in borrowing from his sources, Coornhert reveals 
himself to be also a typical exponent of what is called the scholastic text method of “reverent 
exposition”. This reveals to be a plausible explanation, as Coornhert’s allegiance to scholastic 
thinking (especially Aquinas) has already been demonstrated by Dekker and it also becomes 
obvious in the Zedekunst
20
. The study on the reformed thought on freedom to which I referred 
earlier, states that  
                                                 
18
 See THEO HERMANS (ed.), Door eenen engen hals. Nederlandse beschouwingen over 
vertalen 1550-1670, Den Haag, Stichting Bibliographia Neerlandica, 1996, 61. 
19
 BOETHIUS, The Consolation of philosophy (translated by DAVID R. SLAVITT), Harvard, 
Harvard University Press, 2008, 21. 
20
 As in scholastic reasoning, Coornhert’s theological argumentation often divides itself in 




» this method of reverent exposition involves a hermeneutical procedure which went back to 
the patristic period. Until the breakdown of scholasticism and the historical revolution (both in 
the medieval period and, consequently, in the Reformation and post-Reformation period) an 
authority, be it the Bible, Aristotle, Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, was not quoted in a 
historical way, trying to understand historically what its original author had meant, but was 
primarily read systematically, and so was easily incorporated in the conceptual framework of 





The Bible  
 
As I indicated earlier, Coornhert prominently uses pagan sources to support his program of 
moral perfectibility. This is all the more interesting because, in contrast with his other works, 
Coornhert also doesn’t explicitly quote the Scripture. This is the case in the whole of the 
Zedekunst. The  absence of biblical references has puzzled some of the specialists in the field 
of Coornhert studies, especially since Coornhert wrote the following in his dedication to the 
Zedekunst: 
 
» Want het my gheen grote moeyten ghevallen zoude zyn, al tghene hier bewezen is met 
Redene, oock te bevestighen mette H. schrifture. Dit waar oock al gheschiet, ten waar dan dat 




For a long time, the “special circumstances” Coornhert referred to, have been interpreted in 
the sense of purely external, that is to say, political factors: in fact, it was the Russian 
Coornhert specialist Bruno Becker who created the received view by which Coornhert would 
have only avoided biblical references because of a ban inflicted upon him. As Becker states, 
between 1586-1587, the authorities would have strictly forbidden Coornhert to publish 
anything in relation to the religious debate in order to avoid political commotion. This 
explanation appears to be the most plausible to Becker, because he said Coornhert to have 
published the Zedekunst anonymously
23
, and to have written it on request by his friend 
                                                                                                                                                        
found in ZK I, IV, where Coornhert defends his idea of perfectibility against his protestant 
opponents Calvin, Beza and the preachers from Delft.  
21
 Reformed thought on freedom (v. fn. 17), 25. 
22
 Toe-eyghen brief, 5. 
23
 Becker also adds the following in his introduction to his annotated version of the Zedekunst, 
XIV: “Although the Wellevenskunste was published anonymously, Coornhert’s humanist 
acquaintances (Jan van Hout, Justus Lipsius, Prof. Corn. de Groot e.a.) must have easily 
guessed its author’s name. As a matter of fact, the dedication (Toe-eyghen brief) to Spiegel 
7 
 
Hendrik Spiegel, who had explicitly asked him to resort only to Reason and not to the Bible 
24
. 
In my view, Becker’s theory is not completely satisfactory, since Coornhert still explicitly 
refutes the idea of predestination in the Zedekunst, whereby – albeit without mentioning their 
names – he obviously lashes out against Calvin, Beza and the preachers from Delft. In this 
sense, the Zedekunst unmistakably shows a controversial character, even though it doesn’t 
form its primary goal: Coornhert didn’t want to publish a “kyf-boeck”, as he writes himself  
25. But he also wasn’t one to avoid conflict altogether if he thought he was right. I therefore 
agree with Gerlof Verwey that the explanation for the absence of the biblical text in the 
Zedekunst doesn’t lie in external or political factors alone26.  
Verwey is right in stating that the Bible, divine grace
27
 and scholastic reasoning play a very 
important role in the Zedekunst. The Scripture runs through the whole Zedekunst, but only on 
an intratextual level: the text shows no explicit Bible quotations. This phenomenon can yet 
again be explained on grounds of the ethical project Coornhert wants to carry out, for 
stressing the fact that the Zedekunst’s moral values are principally drawn from the Bible 
would yet again divert the reader’s attention away from the true goal of Coornhert’s ethical 
program: that of self-regulation steered by self-contemplation, that – as will explained in the 
second part of my contribution - of a theoretical form of knowledge to be perfected in 
everyday practice. Furthermore, the overall absence of a general theoretical reflection on 
auctoritas in the Zedekunst is a second indication as to why Coornhert avoided the explicit 
use of the Scripture to support his arguments. In fact, I believe that Coornhert didn’t want the 
Zedekunst to be received like any of the religious pamphlets of his time, since he himself 
thought these “kyf-boecken”28 led their readers away from God and Truth. To my opinion, 
Coornhert knew that any explicit reflection on his auctoritates – be it biblical or pagan – 
would have made more tangible the sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary 
controversial character of his work and cast a doubt on the value of his ethical project. Since 
                                                                                                                                                        
was signed by Thiroplusios Laoskardi, a Greek rendering of Dieryck Volckharts ». [my 
translation] 
24
 Cf. ZK, xv. 
25
 Toe-eyghen brief,  1. 
26
 See GERLOF VERWEY, “Was de ratio van Coornherts argumentatieve theorie in Zedekunst 
(1586) thomistisch van oorsprong?”, in: D.V. Coornhert (1522-1590): polemist en 
vredezoeker. Bijdragen tot plaatsbepaling en herwaardering, Amsterdam, AUP, 2010,  141-
171. 
27
 See ZK III, I. 21-22. 
28
 Toe-eyghen brief,  1. 
8 
 
Coornhert aimed to offer ethical guidance that exceeded the religious differences of his time 
(cf. infra), he surely would have wanted to avoid this kind of negative attention because it 
could hamper the transfer of knowledge necessary to his project of moral conversion.  
 
 
Where pagan meets Christian: the importance of natural law 
 
Apart from the Bible, it is clear that Coornhert also often resorts to ancient thinkers, and he 
does so especially in the first book of the Zedekunst, that is centred around the human 
emotions, a topic many pagan philosophers wrote about. Two compatible explanations come 
to mind. First, the simple fact that the theorisation on human emotions forms a long tradition 
which started in early Antiquity. This makes it quite logical for a writer, especially a 
Renaissance writer like Coornhert to draw upon these sources. Secondly and most 
importantly, in the Zedekunst Coornhert implicitly legitimizes his classical authorities on 
grounds of their compatibility with the Christian thinkers. The link between them lies in the 
principle of “natural law”, the inner virtue each and every man is bestowed with upon birth. 
This principle is central to the perfectibilist project of the Zedekunst, as it will also appear 
from the following analysis of the second book’s fifth chapter (ZK II, V. 11). 
As Becker states, Coornhert gives several meanings to the principle of “natural law”. 
Sometimes he conceives of it as a modern law of physics, saying that “death is a 
manifestation of natural law”, or he uses it to refer to our natural instincts. However, in most 
cases Coornhert understands the principle of natural law as a moral codex written in each and 
every one of us since the dawn of man. This moral codex takes part in the divine grace for it is 
a gift we receive from God, just as the servants in the biblical “parable of the talents” 
(Matthew 25: 14-30). This gift forms the seed out of which our virtue can spring and grow. 
The Zedekunst is written to help its readers rediscover that gift, and again this is why 
Coornhert must avoid the personal anecdote.  
In the first book, Coornhert describes the natural law as “ghezond verstand” 29 or “common 
sense” , but mostly he refers to it as the philosophical-religious principle of the golden rule or 
ethic of reciprocity :  
 
» Ick meyne datmen een ander doe, zo men ghaarne zoude willen dat ons geschiede. Dit 
ghoed ende ware kennisse en behoeftmen niet in duystere boeken, maar inde angheboren 
                                                 
29
 ZK I, XVI, 21. 
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moghelyckheyd vander naturen wet te zoecken. Daar maght elck licht vinden ende verstaan.« 
(ZK I, X. 51)  
 
In brief, Coornhert legitimizes the pagan classics by stating that, on the anthropological 
grounds of natural law, they too had the possibility to lead a truly virtuous life. In this 
possibility, they are equal to the Christian thinkers; as Coornhert under the pseudonym of 
Gamaliël explains in the 7
th
 session of the Synodus he published 4 years before the Zedekunst: 
 
» Heel veel mensen menen met Zwingli en de inwoners van Zürich dat ook de vrome heidenen 
ware kennis van God hebben gehad. Ook Paulus staat niet vreemd tegenover deze opvatting. 
Evenmin is het vreemd dat enkelen van die heidenen zalig zijn geworden, niet zonder, maar 
door Christus, die de Waarheid zelf is, omdat zij, zoals Paulus zegt, hem als kracht in zich 
hebben gehad al kenden zij Christus’ naam niet. Deze mensen betaamt het nog enigszins dat 
zij hun betoog staven met spreuken en voorbeelden van heidenen.«
30  
 
As I see it, the biggest advantage of the natural law-principle lies in the possibility of offering 
an ethical alternative: this alternative opens the possibility of dialogue beyond any of the 
religious differences of Coornhert’s time, differences which for a great deal had to do with 
disputes in Biblical interpretation
31
. This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that - as stated 
by Verwey - the concept of natural law in Coornhert most likely refers to the principle of 
natural reason in the Summa contra gentiles written by Thomas Aquinas
32
.   
But even if the pagan thinkers all had the possibility of the virtuous life, they didn’t all 
“actualize” this possibility33: therefore Coornhert chooses to use only the writings of the truly 
virtuous among them, only the writings that are in accordance with Scripture
34
. The idea of re-
using the pagan authors who accord with the Scripture is already in itself a Biblical thought, 
since it recalls the passages of the “spoliatio Aegyptorum” of Exodus 3 and 1235, passages 
                                                 
30
 DIRK VOLCKERTSZOON COORNHERT, Synode over gewetensvrijheid. Een nauwgezet 
onderzoek in de vergadering gehouden in het jaar 1582 te Vrijburgh (red. JAAP GRUPPELAAR 
e.a.), Amsterdam, AUP, 2008, 83-84.   
31
 See « Brieven-boeck, inhoudende honderdt brieven van D.V. Coornhert », in: Wercken III, 
Amsterdam, Jacob Aertsz., 1630,  296: “Alle geschille in Religions-saecken is om die 
waerheydt vande heylighe schrift ofde vande uytlegginghe van dien.”  
32
In this book, in English The Book on the Truth of the Catholic faith against the Errors of the 
Infidels, natural reason establishes the common ground for dialogue with the Muslims 
Aquinas was asked to convert by one of his fellow Dominicans, Raymond of Penyafort. See 
VERWEY (v. fn. 26), 161. 
33
 The expression is deliberately Aristotelian. 
34
 Coornhert holds the same idea on the church fathers : see COORNHERT (v. fn. 30), 59.  
35
 See KATHY EDEN, Friends hold all things in common. Tradition, Intellectual Property, and 
the Adages of Erasmus, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001. Cf. also  JÜRGEN PIETERS & 
CHRISTOPHE VAN DER VORST, « Cui dono lepidum novum libellum? Van editiewetenschap 
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Coornhert also refers to in his Vande oorsaecke vande Zonde, ‘tgetuygh Platonis36 and that he 
also might have known from Augustine’s De doctrina Christiana37. More plausible, however, 
it seems to me that Coornhert knew this theme through the Antibarbari of Erasmus, whose 
work he admired
38
. As shown by Becker
39
, most of the Zedekunst’s classical quotations are 
taken from Erasmus’ Apophthegmata40.  
One clear example to illustrate Coornhert’s view on the correct use of intellectual authorities 
can be found in the correspondence with Lipsius he inserted in the first part of “Proces van’t 
ketterdooden”. Throughout these letters, Coornhert blames Lipsius for the bad use he makes 
of pagan authors and the Church fathers. According to him, Lipsius didn’t use them according 
to the Scripture to promote virtue and peace. Lipsius only used them in a purely rhetorical 
way to try and trick people into believing his arguments on the persecution of heretics: 
 
» Dese uwe raet dan ende gheboden en komen niet uyt Gode, ende oock niet uyt de 
Goddelijcke reden inden mensche (‘twelck het derde lidt was) maer uyt u, uyt den Heydenen 
ende Vaderen dat menschen zijn, die niet te ghebieden en hebben buyten de Goddelijcke 
Schrift, daer u raet plat jeghen is, oock teghen de rechte redenen, so nu doorgaens is 
ghebleecken: Ende hoort by noemant aenghenomen, maer by elck verstooten te werden, niet 














                                                                                                                                                        
naar traditiewetenschap: Huygens’ Ooghentroost door een nieuwe bril », in : Nederlandse 
Letterkunde, 14,1, 2009, S. 66. 
36
 Year unknown. The passage is available in modern day translation, see BUYS (v. fn. 4), 34. 
37
 In the Bible, Augustine and Erasmus, also comes forth the idea that Christian thinkers can 
make far much better use out of these pagan ideas.  
38
 BUYS  (v. fn. 16), 32.  
39
Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche letterkunde te Leiden (1939-40), Leiden, 
Brill, 1940, 84-86. 
40
 Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, Paris, Albin Michel (coll. 
Bibliothèque de l’Evolution de l’Humanité), 2002, 87: “Les apophthegmes sont des paroles 
célèbres des Anciens, des Pères du désert, prononcées dans une circonstance déterminée. Ce 
genre littéraire existait aussi dans la tradition philosophique  [aside from monastic tradition]: 
on en trouve de nombreux exemples dans l’œuvre de Diogène Laërce.” 
41
COORNHERT, « Proces van't ketter-dooden, ende dwangh der conscientien. Het eerste deel 
politijck. », in : Wercken II, Amsterdam, Jacob Aertsz., 1630, 127. 
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II. Learning the art of living well: of knowledge and Truth in the Zedekunst 
 
 
“Vande kennisse ende wetenschap” 
 
 
As the introductory lines of Coornhert’s somewhat confusing chapter on knowledge and truth 
tell us, the author primarily wrote the Zedekunst for a public of “leerghierighen ongheleerden” 
(ZK II, V. 2). In this context, the expression is to be interpreted in a quite literal sense, 
referring to the emancipated and inquiring minded burgher – like Coornhert42 - who hasn’t 
received a thorough classical education. In a broader sense, however, the expression seems to 
incorporate even those “witty scholars” or “scherpzinnighen gheleerden” (ZK I, V. 2) who 
Coornhert regards as their opposite. This is not only the case in the given chapter on 
knowledge, but also in Coornhert’s dedication to the Zedekunst, in which he already puts 
centre-stage the importance of  the right sort of knowledge for a virtuous life: 
 
» Waart dan niet wel eens tyd, dat niemand en bestond [begint] te beschryden d'alderhooghste 
trappen vande lere, voor ende al eer hy d'aldernederste trappen eerst schickelyck [regelmatig] 
voor-voets-op betreden hadde? Dat niemand zich vergheefs thoofd en brake om te leren lezen, 
zo langhe hy de letteren of a.b.c. noch niet wel gheleert en hadde? Deze nederste trappen ende 
a.b.c. zyn de ware ende ondervindlycke kennissen van onze eyghen ghebreken, van onze 
eyghen wandel ende van ons eyghen quaadheyd, dat is van ons zelve.Ist niet een loutere 
zotheyd, dat wy wanen d'onghemeten Godheyd met zyne godlycke verborghen weghen te 
doorgronden, daar wy onze bepaalde [beperkte] menscheyd ende onze eyghen weghen noch 
int minste niet en konnen verstaan? Dat wy zoo vlytelyck spueren om ydele ende wroeghende 
kennisse te bekomen, met moedwilligh verzuym vande ware ende vruchtbare, ja 
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 Cf. Becker’s introduction (v. fn. 2), XVI: « In zijn andere geschriften heeft Coornhert over 
zijn eigen ‘ongheleertheyt ende onkonstigheyt’ gesproken, en herhaaldelijk onderstreept dat 
hij maar een ‘ongeleerde idioot’ was. Hij had zeker gelijk zich als een ongeleerden leek te 
beschouwen in vergelijking met zijn tegenstanders, waartoe o.a. Calvijn, Beza, Prof. Danaeus, 
Prof. Saravia en Prof. Lipsius behoorden. Men mag dus aan de Wellevenskunste niet te hooge 
eischen stellen en moet bij het lezen steeds in gedachten houden dat het een populair werk 
moest zijn, dat bovendien geschreven is door iemand die geen universiteitsopleiding had 
genoten, evenmin een Latijnsche school had bezocht en Latijn had geleerd toen hij al in de 















Yet, this acknowledgement of one’s own limitations also refers to the topos of the Socratic 
wise man, cf. ZK IV, VII. 71 and ZK V, VII. 53.  
43
 Toe-eyghen brief, 2.  
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Even if Coornhert doesn’t mention the term “ongheleerden” in his dedication, he principally 
addresses his text to the “partydighe menschen” (Toe-eyghen brief, 2) or “biased people”44, 
meaning all of those – especially the scholars - who live in “onverstandighe blindheyd” (Toe-
eyghen brief, 3) by ignoring that one important moral Truth they can find within themselves 
and that will lead them to a life of virtue. Scholars don’t know this Truth because they simply 
don’t look for it: instead, they only analyze dark books45, preferring the writings of their 
teachers over Scripture, in the attempt to understand God and thereby overcome their human 
limitations. Consequently, they lack that necessary knowledge of the self
46
 which they could 
easily acquire through self-contemplation. They give in to perpetual speculation or 
“vernuftelizeren » which prevents them from morally improving themselves and only brings 
them bitterness and distress (Toe-eyghen brief, 2). Hence Coornhert’s motto “Weet of rust”1: 
even knowledge calls for moderation or it becomes “Adamsche weetghiericheyd » (Toe-
eyghen brief, 2).  
It is not without coincidence that both of the above expressions have a double meaning. In a 
theoretical sense, the expression « weet of rust » renders Coornhert’s position against 
curiosity or « weetghiericheyd » for it being an ill-directed « leerghiericheyd »
47
 destined to 
gain knowledge that is only within God’s reach48. In a practical sense, the expression refers to 
the danger of not acting according to secure knowledge or « weten ». Only reasonable 
doubt
49
, says Coornhert, leads us to the « weten » that brings us peace of mind, whereas 
thoughtless actions breed misconception which in turn leads to unhappiness. In Coornhert’s 
view, Adam just as any man must have only aspired to do good. Unfortunately, he allowed 
                                                 
44
 See ZK II, IV. 5: “Hier komtmen in twyfele, zonder datmen van zodanighen zake dan noch 
een oordeel heeft. Dit heetmen eyghentlyck onpartydigh of zonder voor oordeel te wezen. 
Hoewel men oock niet heel zonder reden oock onpartydigh noemt luyden die nu van een zake 
al een oordeel hebben, maar dat zo los, dat zy bereyt zyn zulck huer oordeel te gheven om een 
beter. » On the second page of the “Toe-Eyghen brief”, Coornhert narrows this definition 
down to the group of scholars who only read the writings of their teachers and forget 
Scripture : « De partydighe lezen zelden de godlyke, maar doorghaans de menschelyke 
schriften, te weten: elck die ghemaackt zyn byde leraren daar an hy is hanghende. Daar inne 
vinden zy luttel dat henluyder Adamsche weetghiericheyd mach vernoeghen, maar veel dat de 
zelve meer ende meer vergrotet ende tot meer onghenoeghens voert. » 
45
 See ZK I, IX. 18.  
46
 See Toe-eyghen brief, 2 and  ZK II, V. 38. 
47
 i.e. the desire for knowledge. 
48
 See ZK I, VIII. 12 and « Hert-spiegel godlijcker schrifturen. », in : Wercken I, Amsterdam, 
Jacob Aertsz., 1632, 141. Also see HENK BONGER and ARIE-JAN GELDERBLOM, Weet of rust : 
proza van Coornhert, Amsterdam, Querido, 1993 and HENK BONGER, Dirck Volckertszoon 
Coornhert. Studie over een nuchter en vroom Hollander, Lochem, De Tijdstroom, 43.   
49
 ZK II, V. 34 : « wel twyfelen is zo behulpelycken voorderinghe tot het zeker weten. » 
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himself to be led by illusion, therefore ignoring the certainty of God’s law and eating from 
Tree of knowledge of good and evil. This only brought him fear, pain and shame. 
Furthermore, the reference to Adam’s curiositas fulfills yet another meaning in the light of 
Coornhert’s project : it also accords with Coornhert’s belief that the only kind of certain 
knowledge for man comes from within himself, and that the turn of the self instigated by this 
knowledge can only be acquired through a thorough work of that self on itself.  
Having chosen to principally write for the not classically educated burgher, Coornhert does 
not elaborate on every form of knowledge
50
. In fact, the taxonomy of the different kinds of 
knowledge isn’t what interests him in the first place: for his ethical project, only the 
difference between “kennisse” and “wetenschap” is relevant to him. Yet, Coornhert does 
complicate matters, at least for the modern reader: he defines “wetenschap” by using the exact 
term he wants to contrast it with, namely “kennisse”. Given this overlap between Coornhert’s 
definitions of “kenisse” and “wetenschap”, a general understanding of the Zedekunst’s project 
is needed to distinguish both of the terms correctly.  
Regarding the notion “wetenschap”, Coornhert gives two definitions, the first one being as 
follows:   
 
» Maar de vierde toestemming der kennissen hangt an ware, zekere, ende noodzakelycke 
voortstellen [conclusies], ghenomen uyt ontwyfelycke bewyzinghen, 'tzy dan uyt 
verzochtheyd [ervaring], uyte beginselen der betrachtinghen of uyten wet der naturen. Ende 
deze werdt ghenaamt wetenschap. « (ZK II, V. 11) 
 
 
Coornhert’s description of the term looks quite ambivalent, since it seems to mix up 
epistemological (“beginselen” or axioms) and moral categories (“verzochtheyd” or experience 
and “wet der naturen” or natural law). This is due to one of his central beliefs by which the 
unity of an important (moral) concept – be it truth or virtue – is proven by the circular relation 
between its components: 
 
» Het en magh gheen een zelve ding zyn dat verschillende is in zyn oorsprong, of in zyn 
ghedaante, of int ghene het in bestaat, of eynde, of wercking, of vrucht. Alle deze 
onghelyckheyden zyn ontwyfelyck tusschen het gheloven ende weten.« (ZK II, V. 20) 
 
Therefore, “wetenschap” both originates in and consists of valid theorems or “voortstellen” 
and “beginselen der betrachtinghen”. Virtue, in turn, simultaneously forms the goal, the 
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 Cf. ZK II, V. 2.  
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means and the reward for virtue: becoming virtuous is acting virtuously and vice-versa. The 
same principle counts for the “law of nature” that, as indicated earlier, forms the core of the 
virtuous life because it provides us with the necessary moral knowledge: 
 
» D'alder eerste wortel inden mensche, daar uyt de wetenschappe, voortkomt, is de nature 
zelve. Want de gheneghenheyd [neiging] om te weten is allen redelycken menschen 
angheboren. Doch heeft hy rechte oorzake om tot ware wetenschap te komen die daar weet dat 
hy onwetende is.« (ZK II, V. 33) 
 
As is implied throughout the entire text of the Zedekunst, the circularity of this concept lies in 
the fact that its very rediscovering consists in our acting according to it.  
A second reason why Coornhert’s definition of the term “wetenschap” is problematic, lies in 
the fact that he uses its antonym “kennis” to define it - even though claiming that both of the 
notions are radically different. In the fifth chapter of the second book, Coornhert says that the 
difference between “kennisse” and “wetenschap” corresponds with that between, respectively, 
“faith” and “truth”51. The comparison between “kennisse” and faith would lead us to believe 
that Coornhert understands the term “kennisse” to indicate only those forms of knowledge of 
which the truthfulness is impossible to verify. This could be corroborated by the fact that, 
aside from this prime example, Coornhert also refers to the specific “kennisse” provided by 
the senses and emotive responses, again most often false. Faith, in turn, forms a special kind 
of knowledge because according to Coornhert its falseness arises from the fact that man 
usually believes on grounds of the credibility of others: 
 
» Ende ten laatsten als het toestemmen zich betrout alleenlyck op des zegghers 
gheloofwaardicheyd, ghelyck als wy Christenen, horende: dat zeyt Christus, dat Moyses, dat 
Isaijas, dat Mattheus, dat Paulus, zulck zegghen zonder eenigh twyfelen toestemmen. Dit 
heetmen ghelooven.« (ZK II, V. 7)  
 
 
Again, Coornhert follows Boethius’ Lady Philosophy in stating that it is the message, not the 
messenger that really counts. His words unmistakably show a controversial character for they 
question belief in general: man mostly follows other men instead of divine revelation. It is this 
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 ZK II, V. 19. 
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The definition of knowledge as faith suggests that “wetenschap” and “kennisse” are simply 
antonyms, whereas they are not: aside from this comparison with faith, Coornhert principally 
treats the concept of “kennisse” as an overarching notion for every form of “knowing”, be it 
true or false. In this sense, it can also incorporate wetenschap as its “ vierde toestemming”, the 
one that is always reliable. I would therefore suggest that « wetenschap » can at best be 
translated as « truth ». The concept of « kennisse » can be rendered by the general notion of 
“knowledge”. Coornhert’s second definition of “wetenschap” supports this choice:  
 
» zo houde ick de kennisse of wetenschappe, daar af ick nu handele, te zyn een warachtigh 
verstand der dinghen, te weten een ontwyfelyck begrip des ghemoeds door zekere redene ende 
oorzaken vanden dinghen diemen weet. Of wetenschap is (na 'tzegghen van andere) een zeker 
verstand, vastelyck besloten (geconcludeerd uit) uyt warachtighe voortstellen [premissen].« 
(ZK II, V. 14) 
 
That said, Coornhert explains his inconsistency in distinguishing “kennisse” from 
“wetenschap” further down the page. Except for chapter V of the second book, he chose to 
use both notions as synonyms because he considers it to be a widespread practice among his 
primary public, the common citizen: “Ick menghe hier by wylen onder een de woorden 
kennisse ende wetenschappe ende dit na de ghemeen wyze des volx » (ZK II, V. 16). From 
this it becomes clear that Coornhert pays a lot of attention to reaching his readers. The 
advantage of this strategy of relating to their world, lies in the fact that it furthers the transfer 
of knowledge Coornhert holds necessary to their moral conversion.  
Even more important than the two definitions above, Coornhert also presents “wetenschap” as 
an umbrella term for two specific kinds of knowledge that stand in a circular relation to each 
other and are therefore never to be separated in view of the virtuous life:   
 
» Wel is waar datmen vint voornemelyck tweereleye wetenschappen, elck tot een zonderling 
[afzonderlijk] eynde streckende, zo dat de betrachtelycke kennisse opte waarheyd, ende die 
hantteerlycke opte werckinghe der dueghden 't oghe heeft. Maar des niet te min en werdt noch 
die betrachtelycke van niemanden verkreghen zonder dat innerlycke werck vant betrachten, 
van anmercken, van nadencken, redenpleghinghe ende overweghinghe van 't een teghen 't 
ander.« (ZK II, V. 52) 
 
Coornhert designates these two kinds of knowledge as “betrachtelycke” and “hantteerlycke”, 
respectively theoretical and practical knowledge. Both kinds of knowledge are contemplative 
of nature
53
, forming the two main currents of traditional philosophy symbolized by the letters 
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pi en theta embroidered on the dress of Boethius’ Lady Philosophy. And yet again, the term 
“kennisse” is used to define “wetenschap”.  
In short, it appears from chapter V that Coornhert’s “wetenschap” pertains to truthful 
knowledge. The specific nature of this kind of knowledge only becomes clear in light of the 
general purpose of the Zedekunst: moral improvement of its readers. From this point of view 
it is easy to understand that Coornhert’s “wetenschap” stands for moral Truth of which the 
ultimate embodiment is God. Therefore, his “wetenschap” cannot be translated as “science”, 
since it is subjective and doesn’t refer to an objective scientific truth that can be verified by 
sensorial experience
54
. The subjectivity of this kind of knowledge doesn’t contradict its 
veracity: “wetenschap” has, can, and should be continuously verified through life-experience 
that will prove its reliability.  
The most important difference between “kennisse” and “wetenschap” lies in this very 
possibility of verification by life experience. In his first definition of “wetenschap”, Coornhert 
calls the result of this verification “verzochtheyd” (ZK II, V. 11). It goes without saying that 
self-contemplation plays a very important part in this process, as will be discussed below. It 
comes down to this: in order to assert whether knowledge is truthful, it has to be verified by 
the everyday experience of every man. The truthfulness of knowledge only ever dawns upon 
us after being put into question over and over again: 
 
 
» Maar alsmen ziet int licht met andacht, de dinghen recht verstaat ende men die allengskens 
oeffent metter daad, dan verlaatmen de loghen, dan volghtmen de waarheyd ende dan 
werdtmen dueghdlyck. Dan ismen ghescheyden uyten duysteren nacht van onwetenheyd, 
gheghaan door de schemerighe twyfel des wanens ende ghekomen inden dagh des klaren 
wetenschaps.« (ZK II, V. 48) 
 
Whereas “wetenschap” or truth will never deceive the one who follows it and bring serenity 
and peace of mind, false knowledge - the true nature of which is often clouded by human 
desire
55
 - will prove itself to bring nothing but unhappiness, if not immediately, certainly after 
a certain period of time
56
. 
For Coornhert, this difference between “kennisse” and “wetenschap” is essential, since only 
truthful knowledge or “weten” as he puts it can make it possible for man to act truly 
virtuously, in accordance with God’s laws. In Coornhert’s paradigm, this “weten” is 
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 I therefore chose to translate the chapter’s title by “Of knowledge and Truth”. 
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 ZK II, V. 45-46. 
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 ZK II, V. 44-45. 
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synonymous to  both ware kennis” and “wetenschap” and is also closely related to the first 
cardinal virtue of “wisdom”. Just as in one of the Zedekunst’s main sources, the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Coornhert does not aspire to a mere theoretical (sophia), but an applied wisdom – the 
phronêsis of ancient tradition. This becomes clear in the following definition of wisdom, 
which refers to the individual’s responsibility towards other members of the household or of 
the civil community :   
 
» Daaromme trede ick nu van deze alghemeyne wysheyd tot de byzundere, diemen 
hemeenlyck deylt in drie hooftleden, hoogh dienstlyck zynde totter menschen onderwyzing ter 
dueghden, dats tot wellevens kunste. Deze werden ghenomen na de verscheydenheyd wezende 
int menschelycke leven, mede in dryen begrepen zynde. Want daar is een wyze van leven die 
elck mensche op zich zelf beroert, een die elck huysghesinde in desselfs beleding [bestuur] 
anghaat, ende een die tot onderhouding vande ghemeene tsamenwooning der menschen 
dienende is.Het eerste is een eenzaam [persoonlijk], het tweede is een huyslyck ende het derde 
is een burgherlyck leven. Dit laatste werdt het alderwaardighste gheacht, als meest inde 
hantering van 'tghemeene ghoed (dat verde het alderbeste is) bestaande. Maar hier toe en 
komtmen niet dan by trappen. Want die niet wys en is, en kan zich zelf niet wel bestieren, vele 
minder een huysghezinde ende noch vele minder het ghemeen beste.« (ZK III, V. 22-25) 
 
This leaves us with the question which exact kind of moral truth connects these three kinds of 
wisdom. The next few lines provide us with an answer: 
 
» Noodzakelyck is alle wetenschappe die daar pooght of maackt dat de hertstochten haar 
dienen ende gehoorzamen, maar onnut, ja schadelyck is de kennisse die een dienaarsse blyft 
vande ghewoonlycke hertstochten ende haar laat mesbruycken in d’een om zyn onkuysheyd, 
in d’ander om zyn ghiericheyd [i.e. ], om wraackghiericheyd ende andere zonden te dienen.« 
(ZK II, V, 37). 
 
Here Coornhert clearly states that only secure knowledge regarding the good management of 
our emotions, desires and fears, is really necessary. This applies simultaneously to each of the 
three levels of human action mentioned above: “hier toe en komtmen niet dan by trappen » (ZK 
III, V. 25).  The reason why Coornhert pays this much attention to the topic of human 
emotions, lies in the fact that he perceives of badly handled or controlled passions as the 
second most important obstacle to the ideal of virtuous life he wants to carry out; the first one 








“Betrachtelycke” vs. “hantteerlycke” kennis.  
 
 
As suggested above, Coornhert’s thought on human emotions is central to the perfectibilist 
project of the Zedekunst. The importance of this topic is firstly proven by the fact that it 
covers the whole of the Zedekunst’s first book (as Coornhert also points out in his 
introduction to book II). Its actual centrality however most evidently – and not without 
significance – appears from the fifth chapter of the second book, the title of which as I said 
can be rendered as “Of knowledge and Truth”. As I have shown, Coornhert considers the 
virtuous life to be by any means inaccessible if one doesn’t learn to manage one’s emotions. 
Hence, knowledge and virtue are closely entangled in the project of the Zedekunst
57
, as 
appeared from the previous analysis of Coornhert’s definitions of “kennisse” and 
“wetenschap”. These definitions are deeply embedded in his ethical project since they do not 
refer to pure epistemological, but rather moral concepts. 
Throughout the Zedekunst, the process of learning to control one’s emotions forms the best 
example of the two-step conversion that constitutes the very essence of the ideal of 
“welleven” Coornhert wants to propagate. Each step of this conversion requires a different 
kind of knowledge. Firstly, it requires the purely theoretical knowledge of emotion-
management and the good life. Coornhert refers to this knowledge as "betrachtelycke 




As Coornhert further states, every art’s apprentice needs a competent tutor to learn him the 
basics from which he can develop himself
59
, discover his inner virtue and eventually educate 
others
60
. As shown above, this “inner virtue” or “natural law” is very important: it not only 
forms the basis of every man’s possibility to become virtuous, but also of Coornherts 
legitimization of his intellectual authorities. In the case of the Zedekunst, the tutor takes the 
form of a spiritual advisor. Coornhert takes up this role. As an “onder meester” or 
“ghetuyghe » (ZK I, I. 22), he steers the first conversion of the Zedekunst’s readers, the 
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 ZK II, V. 19:  “ande kennisse des menschen al zyn heyl of verderven is gheleghen. » 
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 ZK III, I. 24-25.  
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 ZK I, I. 19. 
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 Coornhert legitimizes the choice for the virtuous life as a form of gratitude or justice 
towards God. Man can only express this gratitude indirectly, not only by personal virtue, but 
also – according to the golden rule - in converting others to the “welleven”:  ZK IV, IX. 10. 
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completion of which he calls “wedergheboorte”61 since it frees them of their primary sinful 
state. Coornhert must have thought of himself as already “reborn”62, otherwise he wouldn’t 
have judged himself capable of providing the necessary knowledge to help his readers 
understand the potential viciousness of their own person and their current state of affairs
63
 to 
convert them into “willing” a more virtuous life.  
Yet, in spite of his position Coornhert never fails to remain humble: only God has access to 
the full Truth – for he is Truth. Only He can be the one and only true Teacher or “oppersten 
leermeester” (ZK I, I. 22). Coornhert on the contrary can only aspire to perfection within the 
boundaries of human capacity and therefore has to continue questioning himself, as also 
appears clearly from the ‘Toe-Eyghen brief’: 
 
» Deze myne arbeyd heb ick ghaarne tot yghelyx betering ghedaan; alle vrome luyden 
(zonderlinghe ghy oock, jonstighe Spieghel) zullen oock ghaarne de moeyten nemen van my, 
tot myn beteringhe, an te wyzen myne dolinghen die hier inne moghen wezen. Dit zal my een 
ghewenschte beloninghe zyn voor deze myne willighe moeyten. Want ick ben mede een 
mensche als andere, die zo lichtelyck magh dolen, als ick onghaarne dole. God alleen, gheen 
mensch, weet het alles; die is Gode naast, die de minste dolinghe heeft. Zo is oock die opten 
wech om de minste dolinghen te behouden, die meest bereyt is om ter liefden vande waarheyd 
zyn dolinghen rondelyck te bekennen ende spoedelyck te verlaten.« (Toe-Eyghen brief, 5) 
 
As a result of the perfect virtuous life being de facto unattainable for man
64
, it can finally only 
consists in an act of constant self-conversion based on the self-knowledge one first gains 
through self-contemplation both instigated and guided by the tutor’s lessons, and that one 
subsequently has to deepen through autonomous self-contemplation. This is the case for both 
Coornhert and his readers. It is this striving for perfection that Coornhert calls “welleven”, not 
the realisation of the ideal in itself, which obviously explains – aside from the ancient 
tradition of the ars vitae, of course - why Coornhert speaks of the virtuous life in terms of an 
“art”65.  
Coornhert not only uses this metaphor in the title of his ethic, he also returns to it on several 
occasions throughout the Zedekunst. For not only does his reader need a tutor to teach him the 
essential rules of the art of virtue, he also needs to put them into practice to understand them 
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 For further information see “Vande wedergheboorte, hoe die gheschiet” and “Ladder 
Iacobs, de trappe der deughden », in: Wercken I, Amsterdam, Jacob Aertsz., 1632. 
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 See ZK I, I. 20 : « Want niemand en kan anderen 'tgheen hen zelf onbekent is, te recht 
onderwyzen. » 
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 Toe-eyghen brief, 4. 
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better and to become a better man. In other words, Coornhert holds that true virtue cannot 
exist without the “betrachtelycke kennisse” – in itself the result of the “hantteerlycke 
kennisse” he received from others, i.e. the Bible or those pagan authors in accordance with it - 
he delivers being put into practice to become the “hantteerlycke kennisse” of his readers, 
without rational virtue leading to moral virtue or “zedelycke deughde”, the ultimate goal of 
his ethic
66
. As for the difference between “betrachtelycke” and “hantteerlycke” knowledge on 
the one hand, and rational and moral virtue on the other, it lies in the fact that the first two are 
mere theoretical concepts of which the last two notions already define the practical result: 





» Want waar de mensche onredelyck ende blind, vergheefs waar 'tlicht; blijft de mensche 
onachtzaam, vergheefs ist licht voort open oghe des Redens. Ghebreeckt daar tyd om 'tgheen 
men verstaat te hanteren, vergheefs is ghezicht, licht ende opmercking om dueghdlyck te 
worden. Want niemand en kan eenighe kunste die hy noyt en heeft gehantteert.« (ZK II, V. 47) 
 
True knowledge without practice is “onvruchtbare verbeelding”, dead knowledge68. So, just 
like in ancient philosophy, Coornhert subordinates theory to practice
69
. 
After this first, externally appealed conversion through theoretical knowledge, follows a 
conversion based on practice motivated from the inside. After being reborn, the life art- 
apprentice needs to deepen and complete the received knowledge through constant self-
contemplation of which only he is responsible. This theoretical knowledge, of course, comes 
from another individual’s self-contemplation: Coornhert. In this sense, the Zedekunst itself is 
also an act of self-conversion. One look at the first lines of the ‘Toe-eyghen brief’ suffices to 
understand this:  
 
» Hier ziedy, Jonstighe [goedgunstige] Spieghel, mynre ghedachten spieghel vande zonden 
ende dueghden int Licht voortkomen voor alle mans ghezichte. Zo nu iemand zich daar inne 
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incommensurable entre la théorie abstraite de l’art et la création artistique. Or, dans la 




alzo spieghelt datze hem dient tot ware kennisse van zynen state, dats van zich zelve, die heeft 
naast Gode ende zyn andachtigh opmercken in dezen spieghele, die ick u mits dezen toe 
eyghene, u daar af te bedancken.« (Toe-eyghen brief, 1) 
 
With the Zedekunst, Coornhert claims to offer a personal work to his readers, a work he calls 
his “mirror of thoughts”. In order to form others, he first needed the help of others to look 
within himself, again question himself and thereby convert and correct himself again. For a 
great part, these “others” are his auctoritates. Although a theoretical work, Coornhert’s ethic 
can be considered an example of rational virtue being put into practice. As stated earlier, 
Coornhert avoided the personal anecdote in order to reach a larger public.  
So, in short: Coornhert expects and encourages his reader to pursue insight in his own 
condition. This insight he calls the “necessary knowledge of the self” (ZK II, V. 38), and it 
mainly consists of learning how to manage one’s emotions70. In this ideal of emotional and 
moral self-guidance, which is based on secure knowledge and in Coornhert’s terms can be 
described as the combination of moderation (“tem-lust”71)  and gentleness 
(“zachtmoedicheyd”72), lies the goal of Coornhert’s perfectibilist life-philosophy. It is at this 
point that the three motives I mentioned in the introduction, perfectibility – knowledge – and 





In Coornhert’s moral program God, divine grace and the Bible play a very important 
role. As I have shown, ancient authorities are only used insofar as they are in accordance with 
the Scripture. But more interesting than scrutinizing the whole Zedekunst to find each and 
every author Coornhert has used, is to examine the way in which his specific use of these 
intellectual authorities fits in with the role of knowledge in the ethical ideal he wants to carry 
out. As we know, Coornhert’s ideal of the virtuous life calls for a twofold moral conversion. 
To further this conversion, Coornhert practically never mentions his authorities by name. This 
of course allows him to relate to the world of the burghers he wants his Zedekunst first of all 
to attain. More importantly, this absence of explicit quotation also accords with Coornhert’s 
ideal of moral self-regulation on grounds of a norm that comes from inside – not outside- the 
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individual in question. Or better: on grounds of an outside norm reflecting the inner virtue or 
“natural law” of that individual, a law the internalization of which makes the individual 
understand that he’d only ever forgotten that same inner virtue. Stressing the fact that the 
moral knowledge in the Zedekunst is provided by others would impede the reader from 
reaching that second stage of his conversion that leads to true virtue. As Coornhert states, the 
virtuous life is essentially an art, and just as any other art, one has to live and breathe it or else 
it would never be other than plain dead knowledge. 
